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Non-technical summary
Germany has committed itself to reducing its carbon emissions by 25 percent in 2005 as
compared to 1990 emission levels. To achieve this goal, the government has recently
launched an environmental tax reform which entails a continuous increase in energy taxes in
conjunction with a revenue-neutral cut in non-wage labor costs. This policy is supposed to
yield a double dividend, reducing both, the problem of global warming and high
unemployment rates. In addition to domestic actions, international treaties on climate
protection allow for the supplementary use of flexible instruments to exploit cheaper emission
reduction possibilities elsewhere. One concrete option for Germany would be to enter joint
implementation with developing countries such as India where Germany pays emission
reduction abroad rather than meeting its reduction target solely by domestic action. In this
paper, we investigate whether an environmental tax reform cum joint implementation (JI)
provides employment and overall efficiency gains as compared to an environmental tax
reform stand-alone (ETR). We address this question in the framework of a large-scale general
equilibrium model for Germany and India where Germany may undertake joint
implementation with the Indian electricity sector. Our main finding is that joint
implementation offsets adverse effects of carbon emission constraints on the German
economy. JI significantly lowers the level of carbon taxes and thus reduces the total costs of
abatement as well as negative effects on labor demand. In addition, JI triggers direct
investment demand for energy efficient power plants produced in Germany. This provides
positive employment effects and additional income for Germany. For India, joint
implementation equips its electricity industry with scarce capital goods leading to a more
efficient power production with lower electricity prices for the economy and substantial
welfare gains.
JEL classification: D 24, D58, F20, Q25
Keywords: environmental tax reform, joint implementation, productivity gaps, energy
efficiency improvement, computable general equilibrium modeling
11. Introduction
In order to promote international climate policies, Germany has already committed itself to
substantial unilateral emission reductions in the early 1990s: The German government set a
carbon emission reduction target of 25 percent in 2005 as compared to 1990 emission levels
which has been reconfirmed several times since then. Concerns on adverse employment
effects of carbon emission constraints for the national economy have induced policy makers
to adopt an environmental tax reform as a key instrument for meeting the reduction target.
Such a reform entails an increase in environmental taxes together with a revenue-neutral
reduction in labor costs. This policy is supposed to yield a double dividend in the
simultaneous reduction of harmful greenhouse gas emissions (first dividend) and alleviation
of unemployment problems (second dividend). However, while the environmental dividend is
generally beyond controversy, the employment dividend is not. Environmental taxes may well
exacerbate rather than alleviate pre-existing tax distortions. This is because environmental
taxes induce not only market distortions similar to those of the replaced taxes but in addition
new distortions in intermediate and final consumption. The negative impacts on labor demand
by levying additional environmental taxes (tax interaction effect) may dominate the positive
impacts of using additional revenues for cuts in labor costs (revenue recycling effect).
Theoretical and empirical results show that the prospect for the second dividend crucially
depends on the existing inefficiences of the tax system, labor market imperfections and the
level of environmental taxes (i.e. the environmental target).
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The levying as well as the recycling of environmental taxes induce substitution and
output effects. Under a higher emission or energy tax, employment benefits from a positive
substitution effect of labor for energy. However, there is also a negative output effect due to
increased prices and reduced domestic demand. The output effect could outweigh the
substitution effect on labor demand. Given the latter, a policy which achieves an
environmental goal with a weak negative output effect by reducing the level of environmental
taxes and strengthening domestic demand is therefore of interest.
At the strictly domestic level, using lower environmental taxes to ameliorate negative
effects on production activities and labor demand would directly trade off with higher
emissions. Germany would then fall short of its stated reduction target. Yet, international
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 For a survey on the double-dividend literature see Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg (1997).
2treaties on climate protection allow for the supplementary use of flexible instruments to
exploit cheaper emission reduction possibilities elsewhere. The concept of joint
implementation has been incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 1997).
2
 Instead of meeting its reduction target
solely by domestic action, Germany could enter joint implementation with developing
countries such as India, where Germany buys part of its emission reduction from abroad.
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In our analysis below, we investigate whether an environmental tax reform cum joint
implementation (JI) provides employment and overall efficiency gains as compared to an
environmental tax reform stand-alone (ETR). We address this question in the framework of a
large-scale computable general equilibrium model for Germany and India where Germany
may undertake joint implementation with the Indian electricity sector. Our main finding is
that joint implementation offsets adverse effects of carbon emission constraints on the
German economy. Whereas strictly domestic action by Germany (i.e. ETR) implies a loss in
economic performance and employment, JI provides small welfare and employment gains. JI
significantly lowers the level of carbon taxes in Germany and thus reduces the total costs of
abatement as well as negative effects on labor demand. In addition, JI triggers direct
investment demand for energy efficient power plants produced in Germany. This provides
positive employment effects and additional income for Germany. For India, joint
implementation equips its electricity industry with scarce capital goods leading to a more
efficient power production with lower electricity prices for the economy and substantial
welfare gains.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the generic
model structure complemented with extensions for representing joint implementation and
measuring productivity changes. Section 3 describes the policy scenarios and reports our
simulation results. Section 4 entails our conclusions and lines of future research.
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 Under Articel 6, countries with emission reduction targets (Annex I countries) may fund joint implementation
projects in other Annex I countries in return for „emission reduction units“, which may be supplemental to
domestic actions for the purpose of meeting the commitments. Articel 12 defines the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) as joint implementation between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. In the following, we
only refer to joint implementation as the general concept.
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 For detailed information on joint implementation see Kuik et al. (1994), Jackson (1995) and Jepma (1995).
32. Analytical Framework
2.1 Basic Model
This section presents the main characteristics of a comparative-static multi-sector model for
the German and Indian economies (see Appendix A for the algebraic model formulation). The
choice of production sectors captures key dimensions in the analysis of greenhouse gas
abatement such as differences in carbon intensities and the scope for substitutability across
energy goods and carbon-intensive non-energy goods. The energy goods identified in the
model are coal (COL), natural gas (GAS), crude oil (CRU), refined oil products (OIL) and
electricity (ELE). The non-energy sectors include important carbon-intensive industries such
as transportation services (TRN) and an aggregate energy-intensive sector (EIS). The rest of
the production side is divided into other machinery (OME), construction (CNS) and other
manufactures and services (Y). Primary factors include labor, capital and fossil-fuel
resources. Labor is treated as intersectorally mobile within each region, but cannot move
between regions. Capital is sector specific and internationally immobile. Capital stocks are
assumed to be not in the long-run equilibrium. The model captures only short-run adjustment.
A sector-specific resource is used in the production of primary fossil fuels (crude oil, coal and
gas), resulting in upward sloping supply schedules for those goods. Table 1 summarizes the
sectors, countries and primary factors incorporated in the model.
Table 1
Overview of sectors, factors and countries
Sectors Primary factors Countries
COL Coal CAP Capital GER Germany
CRU Crude oil LAB Labor IND India
GAS Natural gas RES Sector-specific resource
OIL Refined oil products
ELE Electricity
EIS Energy-intensive sectors
TRN Transport equipment
OME Other machinery
CNS Construction
Y Manufactures and services
4Production
Nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions are employed to specify the
substitution possibilities in domestic production between capital, labor, energy and material
(non-energy) intermediate inputs.
In the production of commodities other than primary fossil fuels and electricity,
intermediate non-energy goods and crude oil are employed in fixed proportions with an
aggregate of energy, capital and labor at the top level. At the second level, a CES function
describes the substitution possibilities between labor and the aggregate of capital and the
energy composite. At the third level, capital and the energy composite trade off with a
constant elasticity of substitution. The energy aggregate is, in turn, a nested CES composite of
electricity and primary energy inputs. The primary energy composite is defined as a CES
function of coal and a CES aggregate of refined oil and natural gas.
In the production of electricity non-energy goods, crude oil and refined oil products
enter in fixed proportions with a composite of labor, energy, and capital. The latter is given as
a CES function between labor inputs and a restricted CES sub-function of capital and energy.
At the lower energy nest, gas and coal inputs trade off with a constant elasticity of
substitution.
In the fossil fuel production activity (crude oil, natural gas and coal), labor, capital and
energy inputs enter a CES composite at the lower nest. At the top level, this aggregate trades
off with the sector-specific fossil-fuel resource at a constant elasticity of substitution. The
latter is calibrated in consistency with exogenously given price elasticities of fossil fuel
supplies.
Privat demand
Final private demand for goods and services in each region is derived from utility
maximization of a representative household subject to a budget constraint. In our
comparative-static framework, overall investment demand is fixed at the reference level. Total
income of the representative household consists of factor income and transfers. Final demand
of the representative agent is given as a CES composite of an energy aggregate and a non-
energy consumption composite. Substitution patterns within the energy aggregate and the
non-energy consumption bundle are reflected via Cobb-Douglas functions.
5Government demand
The government distributes transfers and provides a public good (including public
investment) which is produced with commodities purchased at market prices. In order to
capture the implications of an environmental tax reform on the efficiency of public fund
raising, the model incorporates the main features of the German tax system: (linear
progressive) income taxes including social insurance contributions, capital taxes (corporate
and trade taxes), value-added taxes and other indirect taxes (e.g. mineral oil tax). In all
simulations, we impose revenue-neutrality in the sense that the level of public provision is
fixed. Subject to this equal-yield constraint, additional revenues from environmental taxes get
recycled through cuts in labor costs (social insurance payments). As to India, we do not
incorporate details of taxation, but assume that constant public good provision is financed
lump-sum by the representative consumer.
International Trade
All commodities are traded internationally. We adopt the Armington assumption that goods
produced in different regions are qualitatively distinct for all commodities. Intermediate as
well as final demands are (nested CES) Armington composites of domestic and imported
varieties.
Germany and India are assumed to be price-takers with respect to the rest of the world
(ROW) which is not explicitly represented as a region in the model. Trade with ROW is
incorporated via perfectly elastic ROW import-supply and export-demand functions. There is
an imposed balance of payment constraint to ensure trade balance between Germany and
India on the one hand, with ROW on the other hand. That is, the value of imports from ROW
to Germany and India must equal the value of exports from these countries to ROW after
including a constant benchmark trade surplus (deficit).
Labor market
The analysis of the employment effects associated with an environmental tax reform requires
an appropriate specification of unemployment for the German economy. In our formulation,
unemployment is generated by the existence of a “wage curve”, which postulates a negative
relationship between the real wage rate and the rate of unemployment. The specific wage
curve employed (see Appendix B) can be derived from trade union wage models as well as
from efficiency wage models (Hutton and Ruocco 1999). As to India, we assume that labor is
in fixed supply and labor markets are perfectly competitive.
62.2 Modeling Joint Implementation
The rationale behind joint implementation is the same as with emissions trading: cost-
effectiveness requires that measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions should be taken where
they are cheapest, i.e. marginal abatement costs should be equalized across different sources.
However, as compared to emissions trading, JI is based on concrete projects. The JI donor
country receives emission credits that may count towards its own emission targets for
carrying out climate protection projects in return for funds and technology given to the JI
host. The implementation of project-based JI mechanisms in top-down models where sectoral
production possibilities are given by aggregate functional forms raises some difficulties.
Instead of using a discrete step-function for the abatement cost curve based on bottom-up
estimates, emission abatement possibilities are implicit to the flexible functional form. The
challenge is to specify and calibrate the functional form in such a way that it provides a
reasonable approximation for the marginal abatement costs available from engineering data.
To this purpose we employ flexible CES functions with a rather sophisticated nesting of
energy inputs. Energy supply and demand calibration is based on physical energy flows and
energy prices (see 2.4). In the model, JI is represented as a sectoral permit trade regime where
sectors in non-abating countries qualifying for JI – in our case the Indian electricity sector –
are endowed with sector-specific emission budgets. The amount of permit rights is set equal
to the baseline carbon emissions of the Indian electricity sector. Under JI, the donor - here
Germany - will demand emission rights (credits) from the JI host - here the Indian power
industry - as long as the price of the emission credit is below its marginal abatement costs at
home. On the other hand, the Indian power industry will deliver emission credits to Germany
as long as the marginal costs of abating carbon in the power industry are lower than the price
or revenue received for the emission credit. According to this arbitrage rule, the Indian
electricity sector will allocate its baseline emission rights between credits for Germany and
demand for its own domestic production. Without joint implementation, the quantity of
available emission rights in German is fixed. Emission credits from joint implementation
enlarge the total emission budget of Germany which allows for a reduction of the domestic
carbon tax while complying with the overall carbon emission constraint.
The principal JI mechanism underlying our model simulations in section 3 is
illustrated in Figure 1. The flexibility mechanisms allow a redistribution of the emission
reductions between the countries, although the overall target reduction is unchanged. Given
7the total emission reduction requirement A  in Germany, only the volume AG will be achieved
by domestic action whereas the remainder AI will be abated by the Indian power industry.
4
The carbon price under a strictly domestic environmental tax reform 2COETRP  is reduced to
2CO
JIP  with JI. Total efficiency gains from JI are given by the shaded area KLM. Distribution
of these gains are determined here via the market solution: The JI donor country receives a net
gain NLM which is equal to its savings of abatement costs adjusted for the expenditure of
purchasing emission credits. The electricity industry in India receives a net gain KLN which
equals the difference between the revenues from the sale of emission credits and its
undergone abatement costs.
Figure 1: Joint Implementation Mechanism
Reflecting the project character of JI, the electricity industry in India uses the revenues from
the sale of emission reductions to buy capital goods directly from Germany. The German
capital goods (coal or gas power plants) increase the capital stock in the Indian electricity
sector. This direct investment exerts a positive effect on employment in the German
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 We assume that JI abatement is fully credible towards domestic abatement requirements and that there is no
minimum share for domestic abatement. For other specifications see Cansier and Krumm (1996), p. 165.
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8manufacturing industries. Additional revenues from permits reduce the electricity price in
India.
2.3 Joint Implementation under Productivity Gaps in the Electricity Producing
Industry
Reflecting empirical evidence we assume that there are productivity differences between
Germany and India in the electricity sector. Since energy efficiency of fossil fuel fired power
plants in Germany is significantly higher than in India, the German industry could invest in
Indian power plants to reduce the productivity difference, hereby improving India's energy
efficiency. In other words, India’s energy producers use the JI revenues received from
Germany for replacement of older inefficient power plants with new highly efficient gas or
coal power plants.
5
 This results ceteris paribus in a decrease in variable costs or an increase in
output.
The cost or productivity gap must be taken into account when assessing joint
implementation projects based on capital transfer to improve efficiency. To measure such a
cost or productivity gap between the German and the Indian power sector, we employ the
measurement of productivity differences as introduced by Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978).
Our approach is similar to the measurement of total factor productivity over time, but will be
applied to measure spatial differences. We use the dual concept of measuring a cost gap.
The point of departure is a joint restricted CES sub-cost function in both countries
which describes production of the energy-capital aggregate EK in the electricity sector from a
fossil fuel composite E and capital K:
(1) ( , , , )C C PE EK K D=
where PE is the price of fossil fuel, EK the output, K the capital stock, and D a dummy
variable. The restricted cost function incorporates the short-run impact of quasi-fixed inputs’
capacity restrictions on total factor productivity (TFP) growth, reflecting a temporary (short-
run) equilibrium. Quasi-fixed inputs should then be evaluated at their shadow rather than their
rental prices (i.e. the ex-post prices rather than the ex-ante prices) in order to derive accurate
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9measures of TFP (Berndt and Fuss 1986). We assume the cost function to be linear
homogenous in EK and K. Because output levels, capital stock and the factor price are
expressed relative to India, the dummy variable takes on the value 0 for India (I) and 1 for
Germany (G). The dummy variable catches country specific deviations from the joint cost
function. It shifts the cost function inwards or outwards. The difference in cost between India
and Germany at a given point in time is calculated as the total differential of the cost function
(1). In form of logarithmic derivatives, we get:
(2)
ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln lnE
d C d PE C d EK C d K C
s
d D d D EK d D K d D D
∂ ∂ ∂
= + + +
∂ ∂ ∂
where 
ln
lnE
C PE E
s
PE C
∂ ⋅
= =
∂
 is the cost share of energy in this aggregate (Shephard’s
Lemma). In equation (2) the partial derivatives of the variable cost function with respect to
the capital stock K represents the savings in costs from a marginal increase in the stock. This
savings in costs is the shadow price of the capital stock ( )sPK . In logarithmic partial
derivative with respect to K, it is the cost share (multiplied by –1), i.e.:
s
C
PK
K
∂
= −
∂
  and  
ln
ln
s
K
PK K C
s
C K
⋅ ∂
= = −
∂
.
Under the additional assumption of profit maximizing supply decisions, we have
PEK C EK= ∂ ∂ . The logarithmic partial derivative with respect to output then corresponds
to the revenue cost-share. By rearranging (2), we get:
(3)
ln ln ln ln ln
E K
C d C d PE PEK EK d EK d K
s s
D d D d D C d D d D
∂ ⋅
= − − +
∂
.
Equation (3) shows the sectoral difference in costs between India and Germany if the costs
were adjusted for the differences in the levels of production, capital stock, and factor prices at
a given point in time. If there is a disadvantage in costs of an Indian sector, then ln C D∂ ∂
is negative. The left-hand side means that with given Indian energy price, output EK and
capital stock K in the German industrial environment, cost would be lower. In the production
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function approach ( , , )EK F E K D= , the equivalent interpretation is that output would be
higher by that percentage if Indian EK is produced with Indian E and K in Germany.
Therefore, in Germany the resources are used more efficiently. The cost gap is calculated by
adjusting the difference in costs by the weighted differences in PE, EK and K. Since under
CRTS of ( )C ⋅  in EK and K and under marginal cost pricing sPEK EK C PK K⋅ = + ⋅ , or
1s
PK KPEK EK
C C
⋅⋅
− =
we can cast (3) into the expression
(3’)
ln ln ln ln ln ( )s
E
PK KC d C d PE d EK d EK K
s
D d D d D d D C d D
⋅∂
= − − −
∂
.
An increase in capital productivity EK K  in India would lower the positive term
ln ( )d EK K
d D
 and would therefore reduce the Indian productivity gap.
As a discrete approximation of the Divisia Index (3), we use the Törnquist index. Then
the cost gap Ds  can be calculated as:
(4)
( )
( ) ( )
ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( )
ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( )
D E
EK K
s C G C I s PE G PE I
s EK G EK I s K G K I
= − − −
− − + −
with ( )1 ( ) ( )
2j j j
s s G s I= +            for        , ,j E EK K= .
Regional differences in the cost structure of two industries result from differences in
the quantities of inputs which, in turn, are determined by the level of production, by factor
prices, and by the capital stock. A descriptive analysis indicates which components are
accountable for the differences in costs but does not determine their contribution in explaining
the differences in factor demand. Therefore, the causes for the changes in the cost gaps have
to be determined by employing an econometric model. For our CGE analysis, we use a CES
specification of the restricted cost function:
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(5) ( )
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0 , ,exp( ) ( ) ( )D K K D E E DC PE EK a a D d d D K d d D
ρ ρ ρρ
−
−
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1
1
σ
ρ
=
+
 is the elasticity of substitution. The cost shares Es , EKs , Ks  and the gap
ln
D
C
s
D
∂
=
∂
 can be derived by differentiating the cost function with respect to PE, EK, K and
D
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. It is
(6)
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0
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E D
D
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d EK
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dC K
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and 0D
s
EK
K
∂
> ∂   
 gives the impact of 
EK
K
 on the difference in costs. The positive sign means
that the difference in costs ( 0)Ds <  will be reduced if capital productivity can be raised in
India.
The following figure (Figure 2) presents the situation. We assume that output is the
same in both countries and that the relative price of energy with respect to capital is
normalized to be one in both countries in a long run equilibrium situation. Given capital
shortage in India, the shadow price of capital, sPK , in India is higher than in Germany,
implying the less steep slope of the iso-cost line for India in its temporary equilibrium. Since
capital is quasi-fixed, India does not produce at its minimal cost combination B. It has to
produce at A with K  = 3, E = 12.5. If India would produce EK = 10 with 4.5 units of capital
instead of its 3 units, it would save 3 units of energy (9.5 instead of 12.5). If it would use only
4 units of energy, it would require about 3 times as much capital than Germany. Since the
Indian electricity industry is in a short-run equilibrium (A), investment in capital through joint
implementation would help to reach the long-run equilibrium in B. Since energy and capital
are internationally traded goods, we assume that the slope of the iso-cost line in B and C is the
same for India’s and Germany’s electricity sector. Since costs are lower in B compared to A,
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the cost gap will be reduced by becoming less negative. From the production side, the saving
in costs can be used to buy more inputs and the increase in the resulting output will reduce the
productivity gap. In the cost gap calculation (4) ln ( )C I  declines, the new 
D
JIs  will be less
negative. Therefore the parameter a0 in the equation (6) for sD has to be revised. Its new value
enters into the variable cost function and thereby into the price determination of PEK. Since
for electricity the demand side determines the size of the aggregate EK (electricity can not be
stored), only a CGE calculation can say whether capital productivity EK K  has changed.
7
 In
a partial equilibrium framework, EK K  will not change if K changes because EK then
changes by the same magnitude, due to constant returns to scale.
Figure 2: Productivity gaps in the electricity sector
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2.4 Parameterization
Benchmark data are used to calibrate parameters of the functional forms from a given set of
quantities, prices and elasticities. Data from two different sources are combined to yield a
consistent benchmark data set for 1995:
• GTAP4 (McDougall, Elbehri and Truong 1998). GTAP includes detailed input-output
tables for 50 sectors and 45 regions with bilateral trade flows for 1995.
• IEA energy balances and energy prices/taxes (IEA 1996). IEA provides statistics on
physical energy flows and energy prices for industrial and household demands.
We accommodate a consistent representation of energy markets in physical units by
replacing GTAP's aggregate input-output monetary values for energy supply and demand with
physical energy flows and energy prices as given in IEA's energy statistics. This "bottom-up"
calibration of energy demands and supplies yields sector-specific and energy-specific CO2
coefficients. The advantage is that marginal abatement cost curves, and hence the cost
evaluation of emission constraints, are based on actual energy flows rather than on aggregate
monetary data, which strengthens the credibility of the quantitative results. The magnitude of
efficiency gains from JI depend crucially on the emission structure in the Indian and German
economy.
14
3. Scenarios and Results
In our simulations we distinguish two scenarios. Our first scenario ETR refers to an
environmental tax reform in Germany where carbon taxes are levied in order to meet a 25
percent reduction of domestic emissions as compared to 1990 emission levels. Carbon taxes
are recycled in a revenue-neutral way to lower labor costs. The second scenario JI allows for
joint implementation with the Indian electricity sector. Germany’s reduction target can be met
by domestic abatement as well as emission reduction undertaken in the Indian power sector.
Table 1 summarizes the implications of the two different abatement scenarios for infra-
marginal welfare (measured in terms of Hicksian-equivalent variation), unemployment and
marginal abatement costs.
Table 1
Welfare, unemployment, marginal abatement cost, emission reductions (percentage change)
ETR JI
Welfare in Germany -0.47 0.03
Welfare in India - 3.16
Unemployment in Germany 0.22 -0.37
Marginal Abatement Cost* 61.36 17.82
Emission reduction in Germany** 242 129
Emission reduction in India** - 113
*   in USD95 per ton of CO2
** in  mio. tons CO2
Welfare
An environmental tax reform stand-alone is far more costly for Germany than carbon taxes
supplemented with joint implementation. Under ETR a carbon tax of roughly 60 USD is
required to cut down Germany's carbon emissions by 25 per cent. With JI the carbon tax can
be reduced to less than 20 USD while ensuring the same overall environmental effectiveness.
Lower domestic abatement efforts reduces costly reallocation of resources towards less
carbon-intensive production (see Table 2 for the sectoral effects on production). Except for
direct efficiency gains from joint abatement under JI Germany benefits from demand for
energy-efficient power plants which triggers additional income. Whereas ETR induces
welfare costs of roughly 0.5 per cent, JI offsets these adverse effects of carbon emission
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constraints. As expected, India is not affected by ETR undertaken in Germany. With JI,
however, India experiences a large increase in welfare (more than 3 per cent). The latter stems
from the substantial productivity increase in electricity production due to the capital stock
augmentation through JI.
Table 2
Sectoral effects on production and employment (percentage change)
GER IND
ETR JI JI
Production
COL -32.31 -16.87 -2.87
GAS -4.22 -5.90 -0.78
OIL -4.76 -1.22 0.33
ELE -4.95 1.79 22.94
EIS -3.11 -0.29 8.54
TRN -0.06 0.18 3.73
OME 0.69 0.19 3.27
CNS -0.11 0.14 0.66
Y -0.44 0.13 1.52
Employment
COL -52.90 -32.64 -30.41
GAS -6.98 -9.67 -5.06
OIL -6.66 -1.74 3.19
ELE -0.43 -0.24 3.00
EIS -1.86 -0.14 2.18
TRN 0.20 0.18 -0.99
OME 0.87 0.22 0.33
CNS -0.03 0.16 -2.59
Y -0.05 0.20 0.24
Unemployment
Our simulations indicate that higher carbon taxes as necessary under ETR are not likely to
yield an employment double dividend given the initial tax distortions and labor market
imperfections in Germany. Carbon tax revenues under ETR amount to nearly 45 bill. USD
which accommodates a reduction in labor costs of about 5 per cent. The implied positive
substitution effects get, however, more than offset by negative output effects due to higher
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energy prices. JI reduces the negative impact of carbon abatement on employment in
Germany. With JI, carbon taxes are reduced and carbon tax revenues fall to 15 billion USD.
As a consequence, labor costs can be lowered by only 2 percent which weakens the
substitution effect in favor of labor. On the other hand, the negative output effect is reduced as
well - with positive implications for labor demand. In addition, there are direct positive effects
on output demand and  employment associated with investment under JI.
Emissions
Under ETR Germany must cut down emissions from 972 mio. tons CO2 to 730 mio. tons
CO2. Entering JI with India, Germany's emissions rise to 843 mio. tons CO2. In other words,
India takes over carbon abatement of 113 mio. tons CO2 as emissions in the Indian electricity
sector decline from 353 mio. tons to 240 mio. tons CO2. Germany then only fulfills 53 per
cent of  its national reduction target domestically - the remaining 47 percent is delivered by
abatement measures in the Indian power sector.
Cost gap reduction
Through joint implementation the capital stock in the Indian electricity sector increases by 15
percent. The reduction in costs due to the movement of the temporary equilibrium towards the
long-run equilibrium (which is characterised by less energy and more capital input) results in
a significant decline of the electricity price in India. The zero profit condition for the Indian
electricity sector states:
( ) 2( ; , , ) I I COPELE ELE C ELE PE PK PL AC A A P⋅ = + − ⋅ .
The costs of abating CO2 ( )( )IAC A  are added to the cost of production and the revenues
from selling permits at the permit price 2COP  are subtracted. Since the revenue is higher than
the cost of abatement, the resulting profit (see the area LNK in Fig. 1) can be used to lower the
price PELE of electricity. Although the price PE of fossil fuel increases by the price of a
permit (see Table 3), the price index of electricity in India declines significantly from 1 to
0.67. As the fossil fuel mix of India has higher CO2 emission coefficients, the price PE in
India is higher than this price in Germany. Energy intensity E/K drops from 0.40 to 0.24 for
India and from 0.33 to 0.22 for Germany. Capital intensity increases from 1.26 to 1.35 for
India and from 1.33 to 1.40 for Germany. Overall, JI improves the performance of the Indian
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economy and narrows the productivity gap in the Indian electricity sector with respect to the
German sector. The initial gap Ds  = -0.46 is reduced to 
JI
Ds  = -0.19 with JI.
Table 3
Effects of JI on the electricity sector
Benchmark JI
IND GER IND GER
K (in bill. USD) 1,46 2,39 1,68 2,39
PK 1.44 1 1.15 0.99
E (in bill. USD) 0,58 0,79 0,39 0,53
PE 1 1 1.38 1.22
EK (in bill. USD) 1,84 3,18 2,27 3,33
PEK 1.46 1 1.09 0.90
PELE 1 1 0.67 0.96
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4. Conclusions
Carbon taxes which are sufficiently high to achieve substantial domestic emission reductions
would have non-negligible adverse impacts on welfare and employment in Germany. JI can
help to reduce these negative effects through the associated cost savings and additional
investment demand from JI host countries. There are, however, some important remarks on
the representation of JI in our analytical framework: Planning and implementation of JI
projects in a developing country like India typically involve considerable control and
transaction costs. These costs may reduce the attractiveness of JI. In our analysis we have
neglected this aspect, mainly because of a lack in accurate data. We also did not consider the
problem that JI between Annex I and non-Annex I countries provides an incentive for the
parties to overstate baseline emission levels in order to generate additional emission rights.
The implications of our results for ongoing negotiations may be important. Many
developing countries have reservations about joint implementation which might be considered
as a pre-stage of binding international emission reduction objectives for the developing world.
Moreover, some developing countries regard compensation projects as a cheap buy-out option
for the industrialized world from their historic obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
However, JI may be the only possibility for developing countries like India to equip its
electricity industry with scarce capital goods yielding large welfare gains through more
efficient power production and lower electricity prices. As to future research, an intertemporal
analysis of the process of capital accumulation in developing countries towards the long-run
equilibrium would be desirable in order to shed more light on the dynamic aspects of joint
implementation.
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Appendix
A. Algebraic Model Summary
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for generic
comparative-static model without unemployment. Two classes of conditions characterize the
competitive equilibrium: zero profit conditions and market clearance conditions. The former
class determines activity levels and the latter determine price levels. In our algebraic
exposition, the notation ziΠ  is used to denote the profit function of sector i where z is the
name assigned to the associated production activity. Differentiating the profit function with
respect to input and output prices provides compensated demand and supply coefficients
(Shephard’s lemma), which appear subsequently in the market clearance conditions. Tables
A1 and A2 explain the notations for variables and parameters. Key elasticities are
summarized in Table A3. For the sake of transparency, we do not write down the explicit
functional forms but instead use the acronyms CET (constant elasticity of transformation),
CES (constant elasticity of substitution), CD (Cobb-Douglas) and LT (Leontief) to indicate
the class of functional form in place.
Zero Profit Conditions
Competitive producers operating a constant return to scale technology earn zero profit in
equilibrium. Profit maximization under constant returns to scale thus implies that the output
price equals the unit cost functions. The value of output to the firms equals the value of sales in
the domestic and the export markets. Costs of production include factor inputs and intermediate
inputs.
Production of goods except fossil fuels and electricity:
(A1) ( ) ( )( )  , , ,  , ,   0
i
Y Y Y
i i j CRU i iCET PX P LT PA PA CES PL CES PK PE Π = − =  ,i j EG∉
Production of fossil fuels:
(A2) ( ) ( )  , , , , ,  0Y Yi i i i i i iCET PX P CES PR CES PE PA PK PL Π = − =  ,i FF j EG∈ ∉
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Production of electricity:
(A3) ( ) ( )( ), , , , , , , , 0Y Y Y Yi i i j CRU OIL i i iCET PX  P LT PA PA PA CES PL C PE K EK D   Π = − =  ,i ELE j EG∈ ∉
Sector-specific energy aggregate:
(A4) ( )( )- , , , 0E Y Y Y Yi i ELE COL GAS OIL PE CES PA CES PA CES PA PA   Π = =  i EG∉
( )E Yi i j = PE - LT PA = 0Π ,i FF j EG∈ ∈
( )- , 0E Y Yi i GAS COL  PE CES PA PA  Π = = i ELE∈
Armington aggregate:
(A5) ( ) 2 2, 0A d CO COdi i i i di = PA  - CES P PM P a  = Π −
Aggregate imports across import regions:
(A6) ( ), , 0M I I Gi i i i = PM - CES P PX = Π
( ), , 0M G G Ii i i i = PM - CES P PX = Π
Investment:
(A7) ( )INV INVi = PINV - LT PAΠ
Public demand:
(A8) ( )( )- , 0Z Z Zi j  PZ  CD PA CES PAΠ = = ,i EG j EG∉ ∈
Household consumption demand:
(A9) ( ) ( )( )- , 0C C Ci j PC CES CD PA CD PAΠ = = ,i EG j EG∉ ∈
Utility production:
(A10) ( )- , 0U   PU CES PC PLΠ = =
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Market Clearance Conditions
Labor:
(A11)
Y
i
i
i
 
L   Y  
 PL
∂ Π
=
∂∑
Capital:
(A12)
Y
i
i i
i
 
K Y
 PK
∂ Π
=
∂
Natural resources:
(A13)
Y
i
ii
i
 
    Q Y
 PR
∂ Π
=
∂
i FF∈
Domestic output:
(A14)
AY
dji d
i i
j di j
 
  =  AY
 PP
∂Π∂ Π
∂ ∂∑ ∑
Sector specific energy aggregate:
(A15)
Y
i
i i
i
 
   E Y
 PE
∂ Π
=
∂
Import aggregate:
(A16)
A
did
i i
d i
 
M   A
 PM
∂ Π
=
∂∑
Armington aggregate:
(A17)
C INV ZY
jd
ji Y C INV Z
j i i i i
   
A       C   INV  Z  Y
  PA  PA PA  PA
∂ ∂ Π ∂Π ∂ ΠΠ
= + + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∑
Foreign closure:
(A18)
, ,Y I Y G
I Gi i
i i i i
i i i
PX Y PX Y
PX PX
 ∂Π ∂Π
⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ∂ ∂ ∑
, ,M I M G
I GI Gi i
i i i i
i i i
PX M PX M B B
PX PX
 ∂Π ∂Π
= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + + ∂ ∂ ∑
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Household consumption:
(A19)
I
ii j ji j FF
C PC PL L  PK K  PQ Q PINV INV PC B
∈
⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅∑ ∑ for I
( )
G
i i j ji j FF
C PC L L PL = PL L + PK K PQ Q PINV INV PC B
∈
⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅∑ ∑ for G
Government consumption:
(A20) Z PZ =⋅ 2 2COP CO other taxes⋅ +
Government output:
(A21) Z Z=
Investment:
(A22) INV  INV=
German carbon emissions:
(A23) 22
A
did CO
i did
d i i
 
CO  A a
 PA
∂ Π
= ⋅
∂∑∑
Representation of Joint Implementation
Market clearance for Armington aggregate with additional investment demand through JI:
(A17’) 2
C INV ZY
jd CO
ji iY C INV Z
j i i i i
   
A       C   INV  Z  b EXP PY
  PA  PA PA  PA
∂ ∂ Π ∂Π ∂ ΠΠ
= + + + + ⋅ ⋅
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∑
German’s carbon emissions constraint:
(A23’) 22
A
did CO
i did
d i i
 
CO EXP  A a
 PA
∂ Π+ = ⋅
∂∑∑
India’s carbon emission constraint in the electricity sector:
(A24’) 22
A
did CO
ELE i did
d i i
 
CO EXP  A a
PA
∂ Π
− = ⋅
∂∑∑
Table A1
Representation of Joint Implementation
EXP JI permit export from India to Germany
2ELECO Endowment of carbon emission rights in the Indian electricity sector
bi Share of JI investment demand directed to sector i
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Table A2
Sets, activity and price variables, endowments
Sets:
i Sectors and goods (aliased with j)
r Regions (aliased with s): G = Germany, I = India
EG All energy goods: Coal, crude oil, refined oil, gas and electricity
FF Primary fossil fuels: Coal, crude oil and gas
d Demand categories: Y = intermediate, C = hh., Z = gov., INV = investment
Activity variables:
iY Production in sector i
iE Aggregate energy input in sector i
iM Aggregate imports of good i
d
iA Armington aggregate for demand category d of good i
INV Aggregate investment
Z Aggregate public output
C Aggregate household consumption
Price variables:
iP Output price of good i produced in region r for domestic market
iPE Price of aggregate energy in sector i
iPX ROW prices of exports and imports in sector i
iPM Import price aggregate for good i
d
iPA Price of Armington aggregate for demand category d of good i
PINV Price of investment demand
PZ Price of government demand
PC Price of aggregate household consumption
PU Utility price index
PL Wage rate
iPK Price of sector specific capital services in sector i
iPQ Rent to natural resources (i ∈ FF)
2COP Price of CO2 permit
Endowments:
L Aggregate labor endowment
iK Aggregate capital endowment
iQ Endowment of natural resource i (i∈FF)
Z Aggregate government demand
INV Aggregate investment demand
B Balance of payment surplus
2CO Endowment of carbon emission rights
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Table A3
Selected elasticities
Elasticity of transformation between production for the domestic
market and production for export
2
Elasticity of substitution between the capital and energy aggregate and
labor in production (except fossil fuels and electricity)
0.3
Elasticity of substitution between capital and energy in production
(except fossil fuels and electricity)
0.5
Elasticity of substitution between electricity and non-electricity energy
goods in production (except fossil fuels and electricity)
0.25
Elasticity of substitution between coal and non-coal fossil fuels in
production (except fossil fuels and electricity)
0.5
Elasticity of substitution between gas and oil in production (except
fossil fuels and electricity)
0.9
Elasticity of supply in COA production 0.5
Elasticity of supply in CRU and GAS production 1
Elasticity of substitution between labor and the capital-energy
aggregate in electricity production
0.5
Elasticity of substitution between gas and coal in electricity
production
4
Elasticity of substitution between energy and non energy composite
in final demand
0.5
Elasticity of substitution between energy goods and between non-
energy goods in final demand
1
Elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels and non-fossil fuels in
government demand
1
Elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels in government demand 0.3
Elasticity of substitution between imports from different regions 2
Elasticity of substitution between imports from different regions for
GAS and ELE
1.5
Elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic inputs 4
Elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic inputs for
GAS and ELE
0.75
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B. Labor Market Specification
Unemployment in Germany is generated by the existence of a “wage curve”, which postulates
a negative relationship between the real wage rate and the rate of unemployment:
( )urg
PC
PL
= , 0,g′ <
with PC the consumer goods price index and ur  (LS – LD)/LS, the unemployment rate. The
wage curve replaces the labor supply curve (Figure B1). Consequently, the equilibrium wage
rate (PL/PC) lies above the market clearing wage rate (PL/PC)* leading to benchmark unem-
ployment (LS–LD). We use a simple specification of the wage curve as a log-linear equation
( ) θ−γ+γ=

 logloglog 10 urPC
PL
,
with γ0 a positive scale parameter, γ1 < 0 the elasticity of the real wage in relation to the
unemployment rate and (1-) the tax wedge between the employers’ gross wage costs and the
employees’ net wages with θ τ
τ
≡
−
+
1
1
w
L
. If the household is rationed on the labor market, the
budget restriction changes in so far as the actual net wage income is by determined
(1 ) DWPL Lτ⋅ − ⋅ . Welfare effects are also based on enforced leisure consumption.
Figure B1: Wage curve and equilibrium unemployment
Real
wage
rate
Wage
curve
LaborLD LSL*
Unemployment
L
LS
*



PC
PL



PC
PL
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C. Calibration of Parameters under a Temporary Equilibrium and a Cost Gap
In this section the calibration of a joint production function for the electricity producing
industry is described, where the Indian sector is in a temporary equilibrium including a
productivity gap.
The joint CES production function is:
(C1) ( ) ( ) 10 , ,exp( )D E E D K K DEK a a D d d D E d d K ρρ ρ −− − = + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ 
where 
1
1
σ
ρ
=
+
 is the elasticity of substitution. The cost-minimizing input coefficients are
(C2) ( ) ( ) ( ), 0expE E D DE PEKd d D a a DEK PE
σ
σ ρ σ = + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅     
(C3) ( ) ( ) ( ), 0expK K D DK PEKd d D a a DEK PE
σ
σ ρ σ = + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅     
where 0( ) 0Da a+ = .
Table C1
Benchmark data for the German electricity sector
GK  (in bill. USD) 2,386
GPK 1
GE  (in bill. USD) 0,794
GPE 1
GEK  (in bill. USD) 3,180
GPEK 1
We start from benchmark data for Germany (D=1) (Table C1) and assume 0.5=σ , i.e.
1ρ = . We obtain from (C2) and (C3):
(C4) , 0.062+ =E E Dd d  , , 0.563+ =K K Dd d .
Energy input for India is 0.582.IE =  In order to construct a figure for the capital stock, we
assume that energy efficiency is lower by 20 percent in India. Since ( )GE K  is 0.333 in
Germany, we assume that ( ) 0.333 1.20 0.399= ⋅ =IE K  (see Figure C1).
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Figure C1: Energy efficiency in Germany and India
We assume 1IPE =  which implies a shadow price of capital for India larger than one. For
calculating this shadow price PK for India we assume that India is in I on the isoquante in a
temporary equilibrium. From ( )IPEMRS PK=  we determine IPK :
(C5)
1
,
,
++    
= =   +    
I I
E E D
K K D
d d K PE
MRS
d d E PK
ρ
Since ( ) 0.399=IE K  and 0,582IE =  we obtain 1,457IK =  and from (5) 1.44=IPK . We
finally assume an efficiency gap of 10 percent, i.e. ( )0.9 1,835I I IEK K E= + = . The
efficiency term in (C1) becomes therefore exp( 0.105 0.105 ),− + ⋅D  i.e. 0 0.105= −a ,
0.105=Da . The productivity gap will be higher than 10 percent because of the temporary
equilibrium situation. The price PEK comes from the zero profit condition
2.681⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ =I I I I I IPEK EK PK K PE E
that is, 1.461=IPEK . The data for India are summarized in Table C2.
I
G
( ) 2.5=IK E
( ) 3=GK E
GEK
K
E
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Table C2
Calibrated benchmark data for the Indian electricity sector
IK  (in bill. USD) 1,457
IPK 1.440
IE  (in bill. USD) 0,582
IPE 1
IEK  (in bill. USD) 1,835
IPEK 1.461
Using these data we can determine Ed  and Kd  from (C2) and (C3):
0.062Ed = , 0.560Kd =
and from (4):
, 0.0004E Dd = , , 0.003K Dd = .
We can then calculate the productivity gap in terms of the dual cost gaps according to (4):
0.794 1 1.835 3.180 3.180 1 1.457 2.386 2.386
ln ln ln 0.426
0.582 2 0.582 0.794 1.835 2 0.582 0.794 1.343D
s    = − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ =−      
In order to derive the variable or restricted cost function C(PE,EK,K,D) we insert E, derived
from (C1), into C PE E= ⋅  and obtain:
( ) ( ) ( )1 10 , ,exp( )D K K D E E DC PE EK a a D d d D K d d Dρ ρρ ρ −− − = ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ 
It is
1.69I
C
PK
K
∂
= − =
∂
and
(C6)
,
0
,
0
exp( )
ln
exp( )
K D
D
E D
D
K E
K d
EK a a
dC
s
D EK a K d d
ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
−
−
− −
⋅
⋅ ⋅ −∂
= = − +
∂ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
.
If Ds  gets smaller, 0a  in (C6) captures this effect and PEK from
( )C PK K
PEK
EK EK
⋅ ⋅
= +
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will decline. If a new gap Ds  has been calculated according to the residual method (4), then
0a  follows from (C6) by solving for 0exp( ) :a ρ− ⋅
,
0
, ,
exp( )
E D
D D
E
K D E D
D K
E
d
s a
d
a
d dEK
s d
K d
ρ
ρρ
ρ ρ
− +
⋅
− ⋅ =    
+ −   
⋅    
.
With joint implementation the gap decreases to 0.187JIDs =  and 0a  becomes 0 0.479a = .
Finally, from profit maximization it is ,
C
PEK
EK
∂
=
∂
 or, in a revenue share:
0
0 ,
exp(( ) )
exp(( ) ) ( )
D
D K K D
EK a a DPEK EK
C EK a a D d d D K
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ
−
− −
⋅ + ⋅ ⋅⋅
=
⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅
.
With German or Indian data, given the calibration, this condition is satisfied. Solved for EK it
is the supply function which we do not need because demand in the CGE framework will in
any case be supplied.
